In several states workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute can collect unemployment benefits. Due to imperfect experience rating, such policies can create a public subsidy to strikes. This study examines whether these policies affect strike activity. In particular, both cross-sectional and fixed effects models are employed to test whether an increase in the public subsidy inherent in unemployment insurance leads to an increase in strike frequency. In several states workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute can collect unemployment benefits. Due to imperfect experience rating, such policies can create a public subsidy to strikes. This study examines whether these policies affect strike activity. In particular, both cross-sectional and fixed effects models are employed to test whether an increase in the public subsidy inherent in unemployment insurance leads to an increase in strike frequency.
I. Introduction
Since the turn of the century, all levels of government in the United States have experimented with providing welfare and unemployment benefits to strikers. Such experiments are always controversial, with the controversy in part focused on whether the benefits increase strike activity. For example, in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, a case involving the payment of unemployment compensation to strikers in Rhode Island, the First Circuit Court said:
[The] present record suffers from a fundamental defect. It provides no support for a causal relationship between the receipt of benefits, which unions obviously desire and often actively seek, and longer, costlier strikes. . . . [The] record lacks even a crude form of what we assume would be the most relevant and probative type of evidencestatistical comparisons of the length and cost of strikes in states granting unemployment benefits (Rhode Island and New York) and the length and cost of strikes of similar size in similar industries in other states not granting such benefits. 1 This paper presents empirical evidence on whether the provision of unemployment insurance to strikers affects strike activity.
Some argue that because government transfers make it easier for strikers to support themselves, it is a truism that such transfers increase strike activity. 2 There is, however, a logical problem. Although government transfers will almost certainly make it easier for strikers to support themselves, that in itself may not lead to increased strike activity. If government transfers strengthen the bargaining position of the union, then one might expect a rational employer to be more willing to settle without a strike, or, failing that, to settle sooner after a strike has begun rather than later. Arguing this way, one could claim that government transfers will reduce strike activity. Thus, it is not obvious how government transfers affect strike activity and empirical evidence must be used to resolve the issue.
Much of the available evidence is anecdotal and taken from case studies. For example, Thieblot and Cowin (1972) used a case study approach to investigate U.S. strikes in which workers received government transfer payments; Gennard (1977) did the same for Great Britain.
More recently, Kennan (1980) used modem statistical methods to analyze the relationship between strike duration and unemployment insurance policies in New York and Rhode Island.
Finally, our monograph (Hutchens, Lipsky, and Stern, 1989) analyzed links between strike activity and a broad range of government welfare and unemployment insurance policies. In that work, however, we did not test hypotheses on the effect of experience rating, under which a firm pays taxes that reflect the cost of the unemployment insurance benefits received by its employees. This study summarizes and extends that work by presenting new results on links between experience rating and strike activity.
The second section of this paper describes current policies for paying unemployment benefits to strikers. There is considerable confusion surrounding this issue. It is widely believed that only two states-New York and Rhode Island-routinely permit strikers to collect unemployment benefits. Although these two states do allow strikers to collect benefits (in New
York after an eight-week waiting period and in Rhode Island after a seven-week period), a majority of other states allow workers unemployed because of a labor dispute to collect unemployment benefits under specific (but not unusual) conditions.
In the third section we use a joint cost theory of strikes to develop testable hypotheses linking unemployment insurance policies to strike activity. The fundamental proposition of joint cost theory is that strike activity is a decreasing function of the combined (union plus management) cost of strikes. To the extent that the provisions of state unemployment insurance laws reduce this combined cost, they will increase strike activity.
The fourth section tests hypotheses using state level data on strike activity. Since unemployment insurance laws vary across-but not within-states, their effects should be revealed through interstate differences in the level of strike activity. Using both cross-sectional and fixed-effects models, we find solid evidence of a link between the provisions of state unemployment insurance laws and strike activity.
II. Current Practice
The The Innocent Bystander Rule. In 1988, 44 states had an "innocent bystander" provision that permits workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute but not affiliated with the strikers to obtain unemployment insurance benefits. More precisely, an innocent bystander must not (1) participate in the labor dispute (e.g., by picketing or refusing to cross a picket line), (2) finance the dispute (e.g., through the payment of union dues that are used to finance strike benefits), or (3) have a direct "interest" in the dispute in the sense of benefitting from its New York not only disqualifies strikers but also innocent bystanders during the first eight weeks.
Thus, New York uses a "no fault" approach, disqualifying all workers unemployed because of a labor dispute in its early stages, and qualifying them for benefits thereafter. This approach avoids the complicated problem of interpreting and administering the innocent bystander and work stoppage provisions. In contrast, Rhode Island's UI program contains both an innocent bystander and a work stoppage provision. Rhode Island workers who qualify under these provisions wait only one week before obtaining benefits. In a sense then, Rhode Island's law is both more "liberal" and more complicated to administer than New York's.
Do such provisions influence strike activity? In the course of collecting our data, we asked this question of all state unemployment insurance administrators. Although none had hard evidence, several speculated that prohibitions against striker receipt of unemployment insurance affect behavior. For example, the Commissioner of the Department of Economic Security in Minnesota wrote, "I believe that there can be little doubt that total disqualification from benefits during a strike, as provided by our law, is a significant consideration for employees faced with a decision whether or not to strike." 4 Similarly, the Department of Employment and Training Commissioner in Vermont wrote, "I believe that the work stoppage portion of the labor dispute disqualification provision is the most significant in affecting behavior of the parties in collective bargaining or industrial relations." 5 Thus, there is an anecdotal basis for the proposition that the payment of unemployment insurance benefits to strikers increases strike activity.
III. Theory
As noted in Kennan's (1986) literature review, although there are many economic theories of strike behavior, no single theory dominates. This paper adopts the "joint cost theory"
developed by Reder and Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980) to derive hypotheses about links between unemployment insurance and strike activity. This theory argues that strike activity is a function of the combined (employer plus employee) cost of a strike, with greater combined cost reducing strike activity. We adopt this perspective not because we believe joint cost theory is dominant-it is largely untested and confronts many worthy competitors-but rather because it yields sharp, testable hypotheses.
Reder and Neumann argue that as the combined cost of strikes rise, bargainers develop protocols that make it easier to reach an agreement. Protocols are "the rules or conventions governing the procedure for negotiating collective-bargaining agreements." These rules or conventions specify the procedures for negotiations, what topics will be covered, and how to know when a settlement is reached; they may include provisions for mediation or arbitration; and they may deal with rates and methods of compensation, work rules, and fringe benefits. For example, many municipal fire departments and firefighter unions abide by the protocol that their salary settlements should exactly equal the salary settlements reached by the municipalities with their police unions.
Although more elaborate protocols facilitate agreements, they are also costly to negotiate.
As such, not all contingencies and procedures will be covered by protocols. "In specifying a protocol, bargainers balance the cost reduction from reduced strike activity against the increased cost of specifying a more detailed protocol…" (Reder and Neumann, 1980, p. 871) . It follows that as the combined cost of strikes rise, bargainers will tend to negotiate more elaborate protocols and thereby reduce both the frequency and duration of strikes.
This logic applies irrespective of the division of strike costs. If strike costs are large and equally divided between the parties, then both will seek to negotiate protocols that minimize strikes. If strike activity imposes large costs on one party but not on the other, then the party that bears the larger costs will tend to make concessions that yield elaborate protocols. Either way, as combined strike costs rise, strike activity should fall, ceteris paribus.
This theory yields clear hypotheses on how government transfer payments affect strike activity. If the transfer payments are wholly financed out of taxes on the struck employer, they will not alter the combined cost of strikes. In this case, although the transfer payments reduce the cost of strikes to strikers, they increase the cost of strikes to the employer by an equal amount.
Since the combined cost of strikes is not altered, strike activity remains unchanged. Strike activity is only affected if the parties to the strike do not bear the full cost of the transfer payment.
In the case of unemployment insurance, employers pay "experience-rated" taxes; when a worker receives $1.00 in unemployment insurance benefits, the employer should pay $1.00 in taxes. But experience rating is not perfect. In all states there are firms that pay taxes that are not commensurate with payments to their employees. For example, according to Topel (1984 Topel ( ), in 1973 Topel ( -1976 a California firm with an insured unemployment rate of 4 percent would pay a tax of 62 cents on each additional dollar of UI benefits. If that firm's insured unemployment rate went above 4.6 percent, its tax on additional UI benefits was zero. Moreover, prior to 1979 unemployment insurance benefits were not subject to the federal income tax. Such "tax preferences" are a form of subsidy to the recipient from the rest of society. Although experience rating usually insures that the struck employer bears some of the cost of unemployment insurance benefits to strikers, imperfect experience rating and tax preferences insure that the employer will generally not pay the full cost. Under these conditions a joint cost model implies that when unemployment insurance benefits are paid to strikers, strike activity will increase.
In particular, one would expect that, because of imperfect experience rating, states with "work stoppage" provisions in their unemployment insurance laws will have greater strike activity, ceteris paribus. In addition, in these states a greater "subsidy" to strikes should cause a higher level of strike activity. More precisely, let B represent the weekly UI benefit received by a striker, let t be the worker's marginal tax rate, and assume that, due to imperfect experience rating, a firm usually pays taxes equal to m% of the UI benefits received by its employees. Then in the event of a strike, the subsidy per striker equals
6 According to joint cost theory, an increase in this subsidy results in greater strike activity, ceteris paribus. Of course, this hypothesis not only applies to work stoppage states, but also to New York and Rhode
Island where strikers receive benefits after a period of disqualification.
The "innocent bystander" rule raises an interesting problem in this regard. Since strikers cannot benefit from this provision, and since the firm pays for it through experience rated taxes, one could argue that the innocent bystander rule increases the combined cost of strikes and thereby reduces strike activity. But this logic may be flawed; it is only valid if in the absence of the rule, firms do not compensate innocent bystanders. 7 Suppose that, in the absence of the rule, the firm bears the full cost of compensating innocent bystanders for their income loss. (This could occur through pre-strike inventory build up, through post-strike catch up, or through strike prone firms paying a compensating wage differential to potentially innocent bystanders.) In this case, an innocent bystander rule could conceivably reduce the cost of strikes to the firm; given imperfect experience rating, under this rule the firm would bear only part of the cost of compensating innocent bystanders. There is then good reason to hypothesize that the innocent bystander rule reduces the combined cost of strikes.
IV. Evidence
In order to test these hypotheses, we collected data on strike activity, control variables, Tables 1 and 2 , the set of states using the work stoppage and innocent bystander rule changed with time, while those using the New York-Rhode Island rule did not. The lack of intertemporal variation in the New York-Rhode Island rule means that the effects of this rule can only be analyzed in a cross-section.
We use the maximum UI benefit in a state as a proxy for the unemployment insurance subsidy per striker. Ideally, the subsidy would be measured as Bk, where B is the weekly UI benefit received by a striker, and
The maximum UI benefit is a good measure of B for three reasons. First, the maximum is strictly a function of state unemployment insurance policy. 9 Second, given their comparatively high earnings, union members are likely to receive unemployment benefits that are at or near the maximum. Third, data on the maximum are available for all states over the 1960-1974 time period.
Insert Table 1 Here   Insert Table 2 Here To compute the subsidy, one would ideally obtain information on k, multiply k by the maximum UI benefit, and thereby obtain a proxy for Bk. That is not, however, possible; there do not exist data on experience rating for all states over the period of analysis. There are, however, a handful of states (referred to as the "reserve-ratio" states) for which experience rating can be measured over most of the time period. For these states one can compute k and, using the maximum UI benefit, obtain a second measure of the UI subsidy per striker. These states can then be used to examine whether the maximum UI benefit is a good proxy for the subsidy per striker.
Our measure of k in these reserve ratio states is derived from Topel (1983 Topel ( , 1984 . Since 
Note that since f(u) is the same for all states, m(s) has the desirable quality of being strictly a function of state experience rating policies; it does not depend on the industrial composition of a state. An appendix is available from the authors with further details on the computation of k.
We use data on strike frequency as a measure of strike activity. More precisely, our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of (# strikes in state i in year j)/ (# labor force participants in state i and year j). The numerator is computed from the U S. We resolved this quandary by collecting data on a long list of variables and examining whether results on UI program parameters were robust to variation in the vector of controls. Our list of 27 control variables included economic variables (e.g., industry composition), political variables (e.g., whether or not the state is a right-to-work state), and demographic variables (e.g., percent female in the state). 12 The empirical literature on strikes links several of these variables to strike activity.
Because specification analyses raise questions about a model's statistical properties, we restricted our examination of alternative control variables to the 1970 cross-section. This permitted us to take advantage of the 1970 Census which provides a wealth of state-level data.
Our strategy was first to use the 1970 data to arrive at a parsimonious vector of control variables.
We then took the resulting specification as given and examined whether results could be replicated in other cross-sections and over time. neither is statistically significant at conventional levels.
The models in columns 2-4 of Table 3 test whether the effect of these UI rules depend on the maximum benefit. Given imperfect experience rating and the tax treatment of unemployment benefits, a higher maximum in states with any of the three rules should lead to lower strike costs, less comprehensive protocols, and increased strike activity. The column 2 model interacts the WS rule with the maximum UI benefit. Since the coefficient on this interaction is positive and statistically significant, the results indicate that a higher maximum benefit in states with the WS rule is associated with a higher strike frequency.
Although similar results obtain when the IB rule is interacted with the maximum benefit, if both the WS rule interaction and the IB rule interaction are included in the regression, then neither is statistically significant (column 3). 13 This is because the two interaction terms are highly correlated. Accordingly, this evidence indicates that either the WS rule interaction or the IB rule interaction is associated with higher strike frequencies. But there is no basis for a claim that one of the interactions is the principle source of the association. Thus, column 4 presents a fourth regression with an interaction between the maximum UI benefit and a variable indicating states that use either the WS rule or the IB rule. The coefficient on this interaction term is positive and statistically significant, a plausible result indicating that for states with either the WS rule or the IB rule, an increase in program generosity, as proxied by the maximum benefit, is associated with more strikes.
Insert Table 3 Here
Such results in part depend on the other independent variables in the model. The Table 3 models include six control variables that are proxies for the complex web of social and economic forces that shape strike activity within a geographic unit. In addition to these, we tested a long list of alternative independent variables. Results on the interaction variable were remarkably insensitive to such changes in specification (for example, see Appendix Table A .1).
The temptation to seek "explanations" for the coefficients on the control variables in Table 3 should be resisted. Consider, for example, the statistically insignificant coefficient on "% establishments with 100+ employees." This coefficient should not be interpreted as revealing that establishment size has little to do with strike activity. That hypothesis is best tested with plant level data. When the state is the unit of observation, this variable acts as a proxy for a network of forces that influence strike activity in the state. Insert Table 4 Here Such results could, however, be challenged as a consequence of unobserved variables.
Suppose there exist unobserved state-specific determinants of strike frequency that are positively correlated with the interaction variable. Then the cross-section results do not address the issue of whether the unemployment insurance system actually leads to more strikes; the results may simply reveal that the interaction variable is correlated with some unobserved state-specific determinant of strike frequency that persists over time.
In order to examine this issue, we ran a fixed-effects version of the model. In essence we pooled together 15 years of data on the 51 jurisdictions and estimated the 1961, 1963, 1965, and 1969 . In such cases we interpolated the missing data. Table 5 presents the fixed-effects results which are quite similar to the cross-section results. The coefficient on the interaction variable is positive and statistically significant, implying that the cross-section results are not simply a product of unobserved, state-specific, fixed effects. Moreover, the magnitude of this coefficient is similar to that in the cross-section.
All regressions indicate that in states that use an innocent bystander or stoppage of work" disqualification rule, a one percent increase in the maximum benefit is associated with a .5 percent increase in strike frequency, ceteris paribus. Since we only tested one model with this pooled data set, the Table 5 results are statistically meaningful in the sense that they are not a consequence of testing numerous models with the same data. Thus, this table offers strong evidence of a link between the payment of UI benefits to strikers and strike frequency.
15
Joint cost theory yields a clear interpretation of the above result: a greater subsidy per striker results in greater strike activity. Yet this interpretation is only tenable if the maximum UI benefit is a good proxy for the subsidy per striker. Since this subsidy not only depends upon the maximum but also experience rating, there are grounds for doubt. For the joint cost interpretation to be fully convincing, better information on the subsidy per striker must be obtained.
We obtained such information by using data on experience rating and federal and state income taxes to compute the subsidy per striker, Bk, where B is the maximum UI benefit and = [1 −
Due to data limitations, the subsidy could only be computed for 27 reserve-ratio states over the period [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] . (An Appendix available on request presents details on computation of k.) In this sample the correlation between B and Bk was .93, suggesting that the maximum is a good proxy for the subsidy.
Insert Table 5 Here Table 6 presents fixed-effect results. The model in column 1 uses the previous interaction variable (the product of the maximum UI benefit and a variable indicating whether a state uses either the WS or the IB rule). Although the coefficient on this variable remains positive, in the smaller sample it ceases to be statistically significant at conventional levels. 16 In column 2 we replace the maximum benefit with our measure of the subsidy per striker. The key finding is that the coefficient on the new interaction variable is positive and attains a higher level of statistical significance than the coefficient on the column 1 interaction variable. As such, a joint cost interpretation of the earlier results is tenable. The Table 6 estimates indicate that replacement of the maximum with the subsidy per striker strengthens the statistical relationship between the unemployment insurance system and strike activity. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that a greater UI subsidy per striker results in more strikes.
V. Conclusion
This study establishes a link between the unemployment insurance system and strike frequency. A higher maximum UI benefit is related to a higher strike frequency in states that use "innocent bystander" or "stoppage of work" disqualification rules. The relationship not only arises in cross-sectional models for 1960, 1966, 1970, and 1974 , but also in a fixed-effects model for the period 1960-1974. Moreover, this relationship is not trivial: In states with these disqualification rules, a one percent increase in the maximum benefit is associated with a .5 percent increase in strike frequency, ceteris paribus. There is good reason to believe that this is a causal relationship; not only are the results consistent with a joint cost theory of strikes, but also, when it is possible to regress strike frequency on a measure of the subsidy per striker, an even stronger relationship obtains. Providing unemployment insurance to strikers does indeed increase strike activity. 9 In contrast the average benefit in the state depends not only on state policy but also on environmental variables like the average wage in the state or the state's ratio of part time to fulltime workers. Since the maximum is an instrument of and depends only on state policy, empirical results on the maximum yield information on the effects of state policy.
10
Consistent with a theory of joint costs, the numerator includes all strikes. Alternative measures (e.g., "number of strikes during the negotiation of new contracts" or "number of strikes over economic issues") are highly correlated with this measure, and yield results similar to those presented here. The denominator is interpolated from data on the resident civilian population in the state in a given year (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-25 No. 460, Table 2 and No. 876, We also estimated models with number of union members and number of establishments in the denominator. Results were thoroughly insensitive to such changes.
11 A joint cost theory yields no hypotheses on the determinants of the average size of strikes (the number of workers involved per strike) in a state. Moreover, to analyze the average size of strikes one should control for the average size of bargaining units in a state, and such data are not available. Although a joint cost theory does yield hypotheses on strike duration, our state level data on the average duration of strikes are inappropriate for testing these hypotheses. Our duration data come from a self-selected sample of bargaining units that actually experienced a strike, and there is no way to control for selection bias. See for the full argument.
l2 More specifically, in addition to the control variables in 14 Note that the coefficient on the interaction variables tends to decline over time. This is in part because the models were run with the maximum benefit measured in nominal dollars. When the maximums were deflated by a price index, these differences nearly disappeared. Signs and tstatistics would not be affected by deflation. 15 As a further check, we estimated a fixed-effects model with the maximum UI benefit as an
